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an introduction to the more precise investigation, by means of labor-
atory and personal methods, which the topic demands. But even
with such modest pretentions the book does good service, for it pre-
sents many subtle and ingenious ideas. The first part, devoted to
memory, includes musicians, poets and orators. M. Arr^at exam-
ines them in turn on motor, visual, auditory, emotional, and intel-
lectual memory.
It is impossible to sum up briefly so many facts, but we may note
in passing that Victor Hugo had enormous command of verbs, but
no exceptional stock of qualifying adjectives of a visual kind.
The second part, devoted to imagination, appears to be quite as
interesting as the first, and newer. He includes under imagination
the facts of manual skill, the movement-memories of the fingers of
the designer, the rich verbal flow of the orator, the incidents of his
piece in the case of the dramatist. Then he describes the creation
of a work of art (p. 127): 1. The conception, whether conscious
or not, finished or not; 2. The execution, which is not alone
the development of the thought : it reacts upon the thought and
modifies it; 3. The emotional state which accompanies the execu-
tion ; 4. The critical judgment by which the author accepts or re-
jects what comes to him ; 5. A certain doubling of consciousness
which results in two different attitudes of mind. Finally, the author
draws an interesting analogy between imagination and delirium, and
shows that the difference resides in the evident control by the intel-
ligence in the former. A. BINET.
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In a previous article Mr. Bradley discussed the intensity of
mental states, maintaining that they possessed degree in various
respects, and were in principle, if not in actual practice, measurable
quantities. Incidentally he asserted that they, or at least some of
them, possessed extensive quantity as well (see this REVIEW, II,
319). To this last point he now recurs. The general principle is
that ultimately everything is psychical; but for the purposes of the
discussion the less sweeping form of statement is adopted—that any
feature of content which makes the meaning of an idea must be
present psychically. It is on this principle that mental states are
said to have weight and odor, to be long and broad. In what sense,
then, is the extension which is predicated of a physical object also
in the soul ? It is true the physical extended is not present psychi-
cally in its full process, and there may even be doubts as to the
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extent to which we possess the abstract feature of its extension ;
still, up to a certain point at least, the extension which we have
psychically present is the same as that which qualifies nature. The
objection that if psychical states are extended they will collide with
one another or with other extended things, is groundless. Spatial
things need not be related spatially at all. The soul contains many
disparate extensions. Is, then, the soul extended ? In respect of
certain of its states, the answer must be as given ; but in itself, and
as a whole, the answer is emphatically, No. For extension is for it
not an all-pervasive, but only a particular and subordinate quality ;
whereas in the physical world it is taken as primary and pre-
dominant.
By way of appendix, Mr. Bradley formulates his doubts respect-
ing the 'extensity' regarded by James and Ward as lying at the
basis of our perceptions of space. These writers, he says, unite in
what are perhaps two errors : claiming to observe extensity as a fact
and denying in effect all non-extensive volume. Volume, he finds,
indeed, everywhere, but either as implying space outright or as in-
volving something less than extensity. By extensity he apparently
understands the quality of 'side-by-sideness.' Nevertheless, while
declining to identify volume with extensity, he goes on to mention
two aspects of volume—viz., 'its intensiveness and its extent' as
present and given, but not distinguished and developed, even in mere
volume. But is not this undistinguished and undeveloped aspect of
extent present, as Mr. Bradley implies, in all sensations, precisely
what Ward, wrongly, perhaps, denying plurality to the intensive
aspect, means by that 'latent or merged plurality' by which he
defines 'extensity?' Whether extensity, in this sense, can be now
observed is a separate question. Mr. Bradley admits that some
such quality must be postulated. H. N. GARDINER.
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Ueber die Beeinflussung einfacher psychischer Vorgange durch korpcrliche
und geistige Arbeit. SIEGFRIED BETTMANN. Psychol. Arbeiten,
I, 152-208. 1895.
Herr Bettmann's paper is a study of the mental fatigue effect of
physical and psychical work. To secure uniform conditions, the
experiments were all made immediately after awaking, the duration
of sleep being carefully regulated. The subject (the author him-
self) arranged his mode of life methodically, avoiding any excite-
